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RETHINKING REVERSE LOCATION
SEARCH WARRANTS
Mohit Rathi*
The conflict between personal liberty and collective security has
challenged Americans throughout the ages. The reverse location search
warrant, which provides police officers with the ability to access location
information on every smartphone that passes within a certain radius around
a crime scene, is the newest chapter in this conflict. This technology is
relatively new, but it is slowly being adopted by technologically savvy police
departments across the country. While the reverse location search warrant
could help officers catch and prevent crimes, the technology comes at the
cost of providing police departments with unprecedented access to the
location information of individuals that might not have otherwise satisfied
traditional probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment.
This Comment first seeks to provide a high-level explanation of the
reverse location search warrant, including the process by which this type of
warrant is served to judges. It then discusses the role of Google, the primary
provider of location information, in cooperating with law enforcement. Next,
it outlines the technical and constitutional concerns created through the use
of reverse location search warrants, specifically addressing concerns around
the accuracy of Google’s location information data, judges’ ability to
meaningfully review these warrants, and potential Fourth Amendment
challenges that reverse location search warrants might face. It next discusses
the benefits that reverse location search warrants might provide to police
departments across the country, including connecting otherwise seemingly
disparate crimes and providing defense attorneys with location information
they can use to protect their clients. Finally, this Comment proposes that the
judiciary create an emergency exception to the probable cause framework in
order to analyze reverse location search warrants. This exception is
necessary because these search warrants raise unique technological and
* Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, Class of 2021. Thank you to everyone who helped
me write and review this note, and special thanks to Professor Ronald Allen and the whole
editing team on the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
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constitutional issues that are difficult to analyze under the probable cause
framework. Alternatively, this Comment provides three common-sense
legislative solutions which, if adopted, would help limit the privacy impact
that reverse location search warrants could have on citizens across the
country.
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INTRODUCTION
From Orwell to The Hunger Games, the concept of a dystopian world
where every citizen’s actions are monitored and reported has been a part of
our society’s subconscious for the past few decades. There is a growing sense
of fear among many people that the same technological changes that have
drastically improved our lifespan and productivity might also bring about the
end of privacy as we know it.1 This Comment examines one such
technological change being adopted by local and federal law enforcement
agencies across the country: the reverse location search warrant. This type of
warrant allows police officers to request cell phone location information from
any mobile device within a certain radius of a crime scene at the time the
crime occurred.
This powerful new technology has the potential to make our lives safer
by helping law enforcement catch dangerous criminals, but it also provides
law enforcement with unprecedented discretion in accessing private location
information. As is so often the case with crime-solving technology, the
question is not whether reverse location search warrants will become more
common, but when they will. In light of this new technology, it is important
to consider what can be done to protect fundamental privacy concerns.
More specifically, the reverse location search warrant has the potential
to erode the Fourth Amendment protection from warrants that lack probable
cause. Currently, courts use the probable cause framework when analyzing
warrants, but reverse location search warrants present unique technological
and constitutional issues that are more difficult to analyze under traditional
probable cause analysis. Accordingly, this Comment argues that courts
should move away from the probable cause framework, at least within the
context of reverse location search warrants, to ensure that they can
adequately protect fundamental privacy concerns. If courts are unwilling to
do so, then federal and state legislatures should adopt new laws and
regulations to ensure that reverse location search warrants are defined

1

See, e.g., Lew McCreary, What Was Privacy?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2008),
https://hbr.org/2008/10/what-was-privacy [https://perma.cc/Q68T-YWX9]; Marc Groman, As
Technology Advances, What Will Happen With Online Privacy?, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2019/01/15/as-technology-advances-what-will-happenwith-online-privacy/#421c69af1c45 [https://perma.cc/XHS2-3LZW]; Charlie Warzel,
Opinion, We No Longer Expect Privacy. You Can Change That, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/opinion/privacy-tips.html [https://perma.cc/ULN8-YY
EH].
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narrowly and that judges have adequate information when deciding whether
to approve these warrants.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on reverse
location search warrants and the process police officers use to request them.
It also analyzes the role of Google, the primary provider of detailed location
information in the modern landscape, in cooperating with law enforcement
agencies. Part II outlines technical concerns raised by reverse location search
warrants, especially with regards to the judicial approval process, and
discusses the potential societal benefits of adopting reverse location search
warrant technology. Part III discusses Fourth Amendment “probable cause”
jurisprudence broadly, as well as the constitutional challenges reverselocation search warrants are likely to face in coming years. Part IV proposes
creating an exception to Fourth Amendment probable cause jurisprudence in
the context of reverse location search warrants, before finally suggesting
three common-sense legislative proposals that could collectively limit these
warrants’ impact on privacy rights.
I. REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE ROLE OF GOOGLE
The reverse location search warrant is a relatively new technology
employed by police officers to catch criminals using the location information
stored on criminals’ phones. This Part of the Comment will provide
background information on the reverse location search warrant, including a
high-level description of the technology and how police officers use it. It will
then describe the role of Google, the primary provider of location information
for reverse location search warrants, in cooperating with law enforcement
agencies across the country. Lastly, this Part will address Google’s response
to privacy concerns and its efforts to push back against overly broad requests
from law enforcement.
A. HOW REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS WORK

Since at least 2017, law enforcement officers across the country have
been using reverse location search warrants.2 Rather than targeting a specific
person, reverse location search warrants target location information pulled
from mobile devices within a specified location.3 This technology is gaining
prominence partially due to the efforts of a corporation, ZetX, which travels

2
Aaron Mak, Close Enough: Police Departments Are Using “Reverse Location Search
Warrants” to Force Google to Hand over Data on Anyone Near a Crime Scene, SLATE:
FUTURE TENSE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/reverse-location-searc
h-warrants-google-police.html [https://perma.cc/K7AW-AF9Y].
3
See id.
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around the country promoting its new software, Trax, to local law
enforcement agencies.4 Trax “recognizes cell phone data in any format from
any provider and uses it to map the cell towers, create visuals of call
information, [and] highlight callers’ habits.”5 Once law enforcement installs
this software, Trax can even automatically fill out search warrants: police
officers simply select the area where the crime occurred on a map, and the
longitudinal coordinates of the crime scene automatically populate directly
into the warrant.6 This technology, combined with corporations such as
Google’s extensive location tracking, makes it easier for law enforcement to
request more reverse location search warrants.
Reverse location search warrants are typically split into two or three
smaller warrant requests.7 In the first warrant, law enforcement requests
location data from a company—almost always Google.8 That company
provides location information from the smartphone of everyone who has
come within a set distance of the crime scene.9 This information is
anonymous at first.10 Once law enforcement officers narrow down the list of
potential suspects based on the individual movement patterns revealed by the
initial data, they request a second warrant to acquire more details, including
the names and account information of any suspects.11 The way Google
obtains this information depends on the type of phone a suspect uses.12
Google obtains this information from Android phones directly; for other
smartphones, Google obtains this information through its applications, such

4

See Merrin Overbeck, Constitutionality of Cell Site Location Information Use, UNIV.
RICH. J. L. & TECH. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://jolt.richmond.edu/2019/09/09/constitutionality-ofcell-site-location-information-use/ [https://perma.cc/U5L5-48HE].
5
Id.
6
Melanie Basich, Trax from Zetx: Visual Analysis, POLICE MAG. (July 17, 2014),
https://www.policemag.com/341174/trax-from-zetx-visual-analysis [https://perma.cc/T82ESDPK].
7
Daniel K. Gelb, Is the Reverse Location Search Warrant Heading in the Wrong
Direction?, 34 CRIM. JUST. 68, 68 (2019).
8
Google is the only company that has admitted to having the technological capability to
perform these searches. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a
Dragnet for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/int
eractive/2019/04/13/us/google-location-tracking-police.html [https://perma.cc/9BMZ-A8PX]
[hereinafter Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones].
9
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault Is a Boon for Law Enforcement. This
Is How It Works., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/04/13/technology/google-sensorvault-location-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/5T8H-395W]
[hereinafter Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault].
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Mak, supra note 2.
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as Gmail, Chrome, or Google Maps.13 Google derives location information
from GPS tracking instead of cell-site location information (CSLI), which
the Supreme Court has held requires a showing of probable cause to access.14
GPS location tracking derives location information from mobile devices
directly instead of triangulating their position based on cell phone towers; as
such, it provides more accurate and detailed information than CSLI.15
The collected GPS information is then loaded into Google’s platform
for hosting location data, Sensorvault, which Google also uses for targeted
advertising.16 For instance, Google uses Sensorvault to check if a person
physically entered a store he or she viewed advertisements for online and
then reports back to the store about whether the advertisement they purchased
was effective.17 It is possible to opt out of sharing location information with
Google in this way;18 however, Google prompts users to re-enable
Sensorvault when setting up applications such as Google Maps or even
regular Google searches with location enabled.19 Thus, it is difficult for
Google users to avoid having their location information collected.
Law enforcement has employed the reverse location search warrant in
multiple jurisdictions.20 Police departments in Raleigh, North Carolina;
Orange County, California; and Minnesota have all used this technology in
the last two years.21 The reverse location search warrant’s growing use raises
serious Fourth Amendment concerns, as people can be searched through the
first warrant22 simply because they walked near a crime scene, which may
not satisfy traditional probable cause analysis.23 As explained further infra,24
the reverse location search warrant arguably puts the cart before the horse
13

See id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (holding that the requirement
for probable cause for a search warrant extended to warrants involving CSLI).
15
Id. at 2219.
16
Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault, supra note 9.
17
Id.
18
Samuel Gibbs, How to Turn off Google’s Location Tracking, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/14/how-to-turn-off-google-locati
on-tracking [https://perma.cc/7CDJ-DQDQ].
19
Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault, supra note 9.
20
See Mak, supra note 2.
21
Id.
22
See George Joseph, Manhattan DA Got Innocent People’s Google Phone Data Through
A ‘Reverse Location’ Search Warrant, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 12, 2019), https://gothamist.com/ne
ws/manhattan-da-got-innocent-peoples-google-phone-data-through-a-reverse-location-sear
ch-warrant [https://perma.cc/T6LM-JX29].
23
See Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8.
24
Infra Part C.
14
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through this first smaller warrant. While the second warrant in a reverse
location search warrant might satisfy the probable cause framework, the first
warrant has a much weaker justification because it is granted simply on the
basis of an individual being near a crime scene.
B. GOOGLE’S COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT

Google can lawfully provide law enforcement officials with customer
location information through the third-party doctrine, a common law
principle which states that people who voluntarily give up their information
to third parties have “no reasonable expectation of privacy.”25 In the case of
reverse location search warrants, the third party is typically Google, which
receives up to 180 requests for location information from law enforcement
per week.26 Under this doctrine, by agreeing to use location services,
customers would likely be considered to have given up their location
information to Google.27 Thus, consumers who opt into Google’s location
services may have their information shared with the government.
Law enforcement officers also send these requests to other tech
corporations that store customer location information.28 One of Google’s
competitors, Apple, maintains that it currently lacks the capability to provide
law enforcement officers with easily digestible location information.29 At
least outwardly, Apple’s approach to sharing geolocation data seems more

25

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.”). The Supreme Court has applied this doctrine in a variety
of contexts. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018); United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 (1984).
26
Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8.
27
See Nathaniel Sobel, Do Geofence Warrants Violate the Fourth Amendment?,
LAWFARE (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-geofence-warrants-violatefourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/ZLE3-THY4] (discussing one recent case that might
resolve this question).
28
Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. That Has to
End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without
-warrant-end/ [https://perma.cc/YA5B-2V8H].
29
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Google Could Be Bankrupting Apple’s Privacy Promises by
Handing over iPhone Data to the Police, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.business
insider.com/google-bankrupting-apple-privacy-promises-by-handing-data-to-police-2019-4
[https://perma.cc/5TYG-LEM2].
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consumer privacy-forward than Google’s.30 Apple’s public refusal to help the
FBI break into the phone of Rizwan Farook, who, in 2015, carried out a
shooting rampage that killed 14 people in San Bernadino, California,
provides further support for this image.31 Apple stated that helping the FBI
investigate Farook would “set a dangerous precedent” for the future.32 Apple
appears to approve of the perception that it is more privacy-forward than
Google, as it has released posters and advertisements mocking Google for its
cooperation with law enforcement.33
The two companies’ apparently differing stances on providing
information to law enforcement might suggest that any needed change to
location information sharing practices must come from individual
corporations like Google. But despite its public persona, even Apple has
provided the FBI with location data it possesses.34 In fact, it’s possible that
the only reason Apple does not provide the same level of information to law
enforcement as Google is because they lack the technological capability to
do so.35 Indeed, given tech companies’ ever-increasing revenue from targeted
advertisements,36 it may be only a matter of time before most or even all tech

30

Kate O’Flaherty, Apple Issues New Blow to Facebook and Google with this Bold
Privacy Move, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/
11/06/apple-issues-new-blow-to-facebook-and-google-with-this-privacy-move/#4fff2
6d1481d [https://perma.cc/UG8C-S5CL]. But see Ian Bogost, Apple’s Empty Grandstanding
About Privacy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2019/01/apples-hypocritical-defense-data-privacy/581680/ [https://perma.cc/3VCP-NJUS].
31
Laura Wagner, The Apple-FBI Debate Over Encryption: FBI Says It May Be Able to
Access Shooter’s iPhone Without Apple’s Help, NPR (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/21/471353161/fbi-says-it-may-be-able-to-access-shootersiphone-without-apples-help [https://perma.cc/82SH-9SSQ].
32
Hamilton, supra note 30.
33
Id.
34
Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, has written that “[w]hen the FBI has requested data that’s
in our possession, we have provided it.” Id.
35
Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8 (investigators involved in using a
reverse location search warrant told the New York Times that they had not sent other tech
companies reverse location search warrant requests, and Apple said it did not have the
capability to perform this kind of search).
36
Megan Graham, Digital Ad Revenue in the US Surpassed $100 Billion for the First Time
in 2018¸ CNBC (May 7, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/07/digital-ad-revenue-in-theus-topped-100-billion-for-the-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/4ZF3-NW95] (explaining that
digital advertising revenue recently hit an all-time high and continues to grow at double-digit
rates).
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companies begin storing detailed location information and providing this
information to law enforcement agencies.37
C. GOOGLE’S RESPONSE TO PRIVACY CONCERNS

In response to growing privacy concerns, Google now elects to provide
consumers with details on the kinds of requests it receives from law
enforcement and the types of data consumers are at risk of disclosing to law
enforcement agencies.38 Google’s Privacy and Terms policy states that the
company receives government requests for information directly, and in
criminal cases it requires search warrants before disclosing the content of
email communications, documents, and photos.39 Google also receives less
extensive requests from law enforcement in the form of court orders.40 Like
search warrants, these court orders typically require judicial review and can
provide officers with information such as IP addresses or non-content
portions of emails such as headers or timestamps.41 Google also states that in
emergency cases, in order to prevent serious bodily harm or death, it
voluntarily discloses user information to government agencies at its own
discretion.42
According to Google, it has made at least some strides in protecting
users’ privacy from law enforcement. For example, Google has stated that it
pushes back against overbroad requests from law enforcement by screening
warrant requests for errors and by asking judges to amend warrants to be less
broad in terms of both the time period and the applications law enforcement

37
But see Note, Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in Government
Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722 (2018) (discussing reasons tech companies might
support privacy laws, namely “their patriotism and desire to maintain positive relationships
with their regulators – even in the absence of appropriate legal process.”). But see Martin
Kaste, Google Explains How it Handles Police Requests for Users’ Data, NPR (Jan. 28, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/01/28/170428992/google-posts-how-it-handles-requests-for-usersdata [https://perma.cc/2272-CJDM] (stating that “[m]ost of the industry thinks tougher
privacy law would be good for business, especially on cloud-based services”).
38
Legal Process for User Data Requests FAQs, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP. HELP CTR.,
https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7381738?hl=en [https://perma.cc/M3S
K-JVZR] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
39
How Google Handles Government Requests for User Information, GOOGLE: PRIVACY
& TERMS, https://policies.google.com/terms/information-requests [https://perma.cc/86DK424P] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (under “Requests for information made to Google LLC”)
[hereinafter GOOGLE: PRIVACY & TERMS].
40
GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP. HELP CTR., supra note 38.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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officers can access.43 Google also claims that it will notify any user whose
information has been legally requested, unless such notifications are
prohibited by law.44 As a recent example, in January, 2020, Google’s legal
investigations team successfully notified a user in Gainesville, Florida that
law enforcement had requested his location information.45 The man had been
flagged as suspicious by a reverse location search warrant because he passed
the scene of a burglary three times while looping around his neighborhood
on his bike.46
Law enforcement officials sometimes try to prevent companies from
notifying users about these requests, arguing that these notifications might
increase suspects’ flight risk.47 At law enforcement’s request, courts can add
a “gag order” under 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) to these warrants.48 In practice, gag
orders bar Google and other tech companies from notifying customers when
the government requests their data.49 These gag orders can last indefinitely,
and according to Mozilla’s chief legal officer, “When requesting user data,
these gag orders are sometimes issued without the government demonstrating
why the gag order is necessary.”50 Though tech giants have been pushing
back against government gag orders through both the court system51 and
creative technological solutions,52 the apparent lack of accountability around
43
Google, Way of a Warrant, YOUTUBE (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=MeKKHxcJfh0 [https://perma.cc/7K73-DYEA] (discussing the role of “producers,”
specialists who alongside Google’s legal team examine warrants and work with investigators
or judges to narrow down or amend overly broad warrants).
44
GOOGLE: PRIVACY & TERMS, supra note 39.
45
Jon Schuppe, Google Tracked His Bike Ride Past a Burglarized Home. That Made Him
a Suspect¸ MSNBC (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/google-trackedhis-bike-ride-past-burglarized-home-made-him-n1151761 [https://perma.cc/AG9R-AW3K].
46
Id.
47
John Ribeiro, Google, Apple, Twitter, in Large Groups Backing Microsoft over ‘Gag
Orders’, IT WORLD (Sept. 4, 2016), https://www.itworld.com/article/3116325/google-appletwitter-in-large-group-backing-microsoft-over-gag-orders.html [https://perma.cc/DN7C-SV
PV].
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. Requests for gag orders are made so frequently that challenging the orders would be
prohibitively expensive for tech companies. As such, the government can obtain gag orders
without proper explanations or any accountability. See id.
51
Dave Lee, Microsoft Sues US Government Over Secret Data Requests, BBC (Apr. 14,
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36050151 [https://perma.cc/V5XE-NZL9].
52
Dan Gillmor, Google Can’t Tell You When the Government Wants Your Data. Here’s
a Sneaky Solution., SLATE TECH. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://slate.com/technology/2015/01/warra
nt-canaries-a-way-for-tech-companies-to-get-around-government-gag-orders.html [https://pe
rma.cc/8TBY-W5TT] (explaining tech companies’ use of the “warrant canary,” a daily email
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gag orders gives law enforcement wide discretion in applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705.53
Lastly, the Google Transparency Report lists the kinds of information
Google typically discloses to law enforcement. The government can access
email content, header information, sign-in IP addresses, and registration
information through Gmail; sign-in IP addresses, registration information,
video upload IP addresses, and private message content through YouTube;
telephone records, billing information, registration information and IP
addresses, stored text message content, and voicemails through Google
Voice; and blog registration information, timestamps, IP addresses, and
private comments through Blogger.54 To some degree, this non-location
information is protected from reverse location search warrant requests
because it must be requested through a second warrant, and the initial warrant
should have only given law enforcement access to anonymized location
information. Still, as explained further below, this protection is not absolute.
Reverse location search warrants can lead to the distribution of innocent
persons’ personal information to the police.
II. REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS: CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS
Like any new technology, reverse location search warrants present both
challenges and benefits. This Part will address some of the technical
challenges created by reverse location search warrants, including concerns
related to the accuracy of Google’s data and potential problems with how
reverse location search warrants are served to judges. It will then lay out
potential societal benefits created by the use of reverse location search
warrants. These benefits include helping police officers catch criminals more
efficiently and providing defense attorneys with a wealth of location
information that they might then use to prevent wrongful convictions.
A. CHALLENGES POSED BY REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS

There are many technical concerns relating to the technology law
enforcement uses to obtain reverse location search warrants. These concerns
include the fact that GPS coordinates, rather than physical maps, are typically
provided to the judges who review reverse location search warrants, that
location information in these warrants may be inaccurate, and that innocent
service consumers can sign up for confirming that one’s data has not been requested by law
enforcement. The daily email does not arrive on days when law enforcement did actually
request data).
53
Ribeiro, supra note 47.
54
GOOGLE: PRIVACY & TERMS, supra note 39 (under “What kinds of information do you
disclose for different products?”).
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people’s data can be at risk when these warrants are too broad. These
concerns, while often technological in nature, always link back to the Fourth
Amendment, which requires that all search warrants are supported by
probable cause.55
1. How Reverse Location Search Warrants Are Served to Judges
One pressing concern is the way in which reverse location search
warrant requests are served to judges. Specifically, reverse location search
warrants often include complex GPS coordinates instead of a physical map
displaying the area the warrant intends to surveil.56 Police officers often map
out the coordinates of the area they wish to survey within the Trax software
(and related products such as Google Earth), but officers do not always
provide these illustrations to judges, nor are they required to.57 In the words
of ACLU attorney Nathan Freed Wessler, “Most human beings can’t
interpret large strings of numbers and GPS coordinates without a map to
illustrate them, and judges are no exception.”58 It seems unlikely that judges
can accurately ascertain the size and physical features of the area they are
authorizing for a search based on latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates
alone, without a physical map to illustrate the buildings and general area
covered by the reverse location search warrant. This is especially true in
comparison to traditional search warrants, which typically authorize the
search of a specific residence, computer, or person instead of an area
generally.59
The volume of unsynthesized data presented by reverse location search
warrants is especially problematic in light of the fast turnaround times for

55

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Tim Cushing, Minnesota Judges Spent Only Minutes Approving Warrants Sweeping Up
Thousands of Cellphone Users, TECHDIRT (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20190211/08125241570/minnesota-judges-spent-only-minutes-approving-warrants-sweepi
ng-up-thousands-cellphone-users.shtml [https://perma.cc/HNJ6-AYYN].
57
Tony Webster, How Did the Police Know You Were Near a Crime Scene? Google Told
Them, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/02/07/googlelocation-police-search-warrants [https://perma.cc/3LWR-Z9HV] (noting that only three of
twenty-two warrants issued in Hennepin County, Minnesota included a map for the judges to
visualize the area that the warrants encompassed).
58
Yves Smith, “Reverse Location Search Warrant”: A New Personal Data Hoovering
Exercise Brought to You by Google, NAKED CAPITALISM (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.naked
capitalism.com/2019/02/reverse-location-search-warrant-a-new-personal-data-hooveringexercise-brought-to-you-by-google.html [https://perma.cc/X8H6-ALTJ].
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FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A).
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search warrants in the modern era. A recent survey of public records60
showed that most judges in Utah took less than three minutes to sign off on
more than half of the warrants police had submitted over the period of a
year.61 The same study showed that judges spent about eight minutes on
average reviewing a warrant and denied only two percent of proposed
warrants.62 Reviewing warrants so quickly can make meaningful review
difficult, especially when complex technical information like longitudinal
coordinates is involved. As one example, a judge in Edina, Minnesota
reviewed a reverse location search warrant (which did not even include a map
of the targeted area) for a maximum of four minutes before signing off on
it.63 Reviewing the warrant for such a short period of time makes it unlikely
that the judge could analyze both the rationale behind the warrant and the
scope of the area he or she was permitting the police to survey, especially
without a map.64 This concern is especially salient given that reverse location
search warrants can cover a geographical area many times wider than
traditional crime scenes, and a judge might have no idea that he or she signed
off on a search of such a wide area.65
2. Concerns Related to Accuracy and Effectiveness
Reverse location search warrants also raise legitimate concerns related
to the effectiveness and accuracy of location information. Research has
shown that under some conditions, Google overestimates its own accuracy
with regards to the exact location of a user ninety-three percent of the time.66
Indeed, according to a 2018 forensic sciences study published by the U.S.
National Library of Medicine, Google could only accurately ascertain that a
device was somewhere within a fifty-two meter radius.67 In tightly packed

60

Conner Boyack, Is the Warrant System Working Well?, LIBERTAS INST. (June 6, 2019),
https://libertasutah.org/justice-and-due-process/is-the-warrant-system-working-well/
[https://perma.cc/K8T2-J36Y].
61
Jessica Miller, New Data Show Utah Judges Are Often Spending Less than Three
Minutes Viewing Warrants Before Approval, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 9, 2018), https://www.sl
trib.com/news/2018/01/14/warrants-approved-in-just-minutes-are-utah-judges-really-reading
-them-before-signing-off/ [https://perma.cc/A78F-UBSR].
62
Id.
63
Cushing, supra note 56.
64
Id.
65
Webster, supra note 57.
66
Smith, supra note 58.
67
Id.; for the study, see Andrea Marcellus Rodriguez, Christian Tiberius, Roel van Bree,
Zeno Geradst, Google Timeline Accuracy Assessment and Error Prediction, U.S. NAT’L
LIBRARY OF MED. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6201806/
[https://perma.cc/55HG-EEFL].
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urban environments such as metropolitan cities, fifty-two meters can mean
the difference between being directly at the scene of a crime and at home
asleep a few floors upstairs. And because judges may grant a second, more
extensive, search warrant on the basis of suspicious location movements
tracked during the first warrant,68 inaccurate location information pulled in
response to the first warrant could lead to innocent parties having their
information shared with the police, raising significant privacy concerns.
Similarly problematic is the fact that, as the technology used to generate
reverse location search warrants becomes more widely known, professional
criminals might learn to opt out of location sharing services, leave their
cellular devices at home during crimes, or stop using smart phones entirely.
Google allows users to clear their Google Maps history,69 and criminals
might be more likely to use this feature because they have something to hide.
On the other hand, innocent people, who have nothing to hide from law
enforcement, might not adopt the same precautions. Thus, if professional
criminals are able to effectively dodge reverse location search warrants, the
use of these warrants could drive up the number of wrongful arrests in
criminal cases and even result in wrongful convictions.
This risk of increasing wrongful convictions is sobering, especially
given the United States’ already high rate of wrongful convictions.70
Moreover, wrongful convictions disproportionately victimize Black
people.71 Studies show, for example, that Black people wrongfully convicted
of crimes like murder must wait longer to be exonerated compared to their
white counterparts.72 In this way, reverse location search warrants may have
troubling implications for racial justice. To accurately ascertain whether the
risk of wrongful convictions would increase over time because of reverse
location search warrants, further research must be conducted.

68

See Gelb, supra note 7, at 68.
Andrew Martonik, How to Clear Search and Location History in Google Maps on
Android, ANDROIDCENTRAL (July 26, 2019), https://www.androidcentral.com/how-clearsearch-and-location-history-google-maps-android [https://perma.cc/93SF-8Y3J].
70
Samuel Gross, The Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in America, WASH.
POST (July 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cost-of-convicting-theinnocent/2015/07/24/260fc3a2-1aae-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html [https://perma.cc/
FLM6-Y2VA] (citing studies that show up to 4.1% of defendants sentenced to death might be
wrongfully convicted).
71
Niraj Chokshi, Black People More Likely to Be Wrongfully Convicted of Murder, Study
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/us/wrongful-conv
ictions-race-exoneration.html [https://perma.cc/XAN9-E7S9].
72
Id.
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3. The Collection of Innocent People’s Data
Even if reverse location search warrants do not lead to an increase in
wrongful convictions, at the very least, this technology could result in the
collection of many innocent people’s data. Police departments often request
location information tracked hours before and after a crime and from areas
much larger than the crime scene itself.73 Once police close the case, the
location data collected, as well as any other information brought up during
the course of the second warrant, could become part of the case file whether
accurate or not.74 Case files become part of the public record, and for this
reason, details about innocent individuals’ locations could become subject to
public scrutiny.75
Because Trax is so new, case files involving investigations where police
have used this technology are still largely open and thus unavailable to the
public.76 Cause for concern is growing, however, as once these records
become available to the public77 or get leaked, the tracked location
information could become subject to scrutiny from the press. This scenario
is not unprecedented. An innocent man in Minnesota who drove a cab within
170 feet of a crime scene had his name released to a local journalist after it
become part of the police record.78 Furthermore, there is a risk of police
officers themselves accessing location data once it becomes part of a criminal
file. This access opens up the potential for abuse of power by malicious law
enforcement officers who can find people’s home addresses and daily
schedules, among other information.79
73

Smith, supra note 58 (stating that one query made by the federal government covered a
total area of 45 hectares, or 111 acres).
74
Id.
75
Contra 5 U.S.C. § 552 (stating The Freedom of Information Act would protect against
any requested location information which fell under the personal privacy exemption, but the
location information would remain on police systems).
76
Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8. For one example of a legal
challenge against reverse location search warrants currently in the court system, see Tim
Cushing, Reverse Warrant Used in Robbery Investigation Being Challenged as
Unconstitutional, TECHDIRT (July 10, 2020), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200709/131
85544875/reverse-warrant-used-robbery-investigation-being-challenged-as-unconstitutional.
shtml [https://perma.cc/B9FS-XRJK]; see also Sobel, supra note 27.
77
Paul Grabowicz, Police Records, BERKELEY GRADUATE SCH. OF JOURNALISM,
ADVANCED MEDIA INST., https://multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/tutorials/police-records/
[https://perma.cc/ZTH2-PNR9] (discussing the process by which police records become
available to the public or reporters and how it can vary state by state).
78
Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8.
79
Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. That Has to
End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without
-warrant-end [https://perma.cc/9FM7-HHDA].
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A final privacy concern related to information collected by law
enforcement is that it could be collected or hacked by malicious third parties.
One recent data breach incident involving the Los Angeles Police
Department resulted in “the personal information of at least 20,000 people”
being shared with malicious hackers.80 Despite law enforcement agencies’
efforts to prevent leaks and abuse by officers, the sheer amount of data
processed in reverse location search warrants makes the likelihood of error
and serious harm to innocent people an ever-present danger.
B. SOCIETAL BENEFITS CREATED BY REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH
WARRANTS

Despite these drawbacks, reverse location search warrants could also
create benefits, both for law enforcement agencies and for the constituencies
they police. By providing law enforcement officers with a visual
representation of detailed location information for hundreds of people near a
crime scene, reverse location search warrants can help law enforcement solve
crimes and even connect otherwise seemingly disparate crimes. Location
information in the hands of skilled defense attorneys also has the potential to
exonerate innocent suspects and prevent wrongful convictions from
occurring in the first place.
1. Solving Crimes
The primary benefit of the reverse location search warrant is its potential
to solve crimes and catch criminals. The reverse location search warrant
provides law enforcement agencies with detailed, anonymized location
information for everyone who passes within a certain distance of the scene
of a crime.81 Police officers can use this wealth of information to find people
with suspicious location histories. For example, they might discover a person
who went to a local gun store the day before passing in front of the scene of
a shooting. They can then in turn use this information to request a second
warrant, gathering more detailed information on the potential suspect.82
Law enforcement agencies are already using these warrants to arrest
suspects in certain jurisdictions. In Virginia, authorities arrested a suspect for
80
Zak Doffman, Cyberattack on LAPD Confirmed: Data Breach Impacts Thousands of
Officers, FORBES (July 30, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/30/lapdcyberattack-police-department-confirms-it-has-been-hacked/#55251e5a14be [https://perma.c
c/K56K-YNPH] (discussing a data breach where the names, dates of birth, email addresses,
passwords, and even the last four digits of social security numbers for over 17,500 police
applicants and 2,500 police officers were collected by hackers and potentially put up for sale).
81
82

Mak, supra note 2.
Id.
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robbing a bank based on the results of a reverse location search warrant sent
to Google.83 Examples such as this show the crime-fighting potential of the
tool. Prosecutors and police officers assert that the tool has also proved
helpful in “solving crimes such as pattern burglaries, arsons, and sexual
assaults.”84
While the crime-solving potential of this technology is clear, it may be
difficult for certain law enforcement agencies to reap the benefits of reverse
location search warrants. Urban areas, in particular, provide law enforcement
agencies using reverse location search warrants with a special challenge. This
is because a warrant for even a relatively small area in a metropolitan center
(e.g., Times Square) might collect a huge number of people’ information,
making it more difficult for law enforcement officials to home in on
suspects.85 On the other hand, police departments in urban areas also tend to
be larger and better funded than police departments in rural areas.86 Thus,
they may be well-positioned to use reverse location search warrants
effectively.87 For instance, larger bureaucracy and support staff presence at
urban police departments can provide police officers with better
implementation and integration of crime-mapping software.88 Furthermore,
larger police departments might be more likely to involve crime analytics
staff in the use of crime-mapping technology like reverse location search

83

Wendy Davis, Law Enforcement is Using Location Tracking on Mobile Devices
to Identify Suspects, But is it Unconstitutional?, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2020) https://w
ww.abajournal.com/magazine/article/law-enforcement-is-using-location-trackingon-mobile-devices-to-identify-suspects-geofence [https://perma.cc/S3F5-DKLS].
84
Id. On the other hand, it is unclear exactly how helpful the tool is when
compared when traditional policing methods.
85

Andrew Perrin, Digital Gap Between Rural and Nonrural America Persists, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (May 31, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/31/digital-gap-betwee
n-rural-and-nonrural-america-persists/ [https://perma.cc/4N5F-6ZML].
86
Shako Liu & Phil McClausland, Rural Police Struggle to Recruit Amid Poor Pay and
Public Perception, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2019) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/rur
al-police-struggle-recruit-amid-poor-pay-public-perception-n1078496 [https://perma.cc/3SJ
N-A2V9] (urban areas tend to pay police officers better and be better staffed compared to rural
areas, which have difficulties “acquiring up-to-date law enforcement resources and technology
as they grapple with budget shortfalls.”).
87
See generally KEVIN STROM, NAT. CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., RESEARCH ON THE
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON POLICING STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL REPORT
SERVICE (Sept. 2017), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251140.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F2VN-FTQS] (discussing how technology might positively impact policing strategy in the
coming years).
88
Id. at 4–6.
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warrants. This specialized staff is often tech savvy and in a better position to
assess the accuracy of mapping results than patrolling officers.89
Currently, adequate research into the effectiveness of reverse location
search warrants is lacking.90 Still, other crime-mapping solutions such as
“hot-spot policing” and “risk-terrain modeling” have been shown to produce
measurable benefits in urban municipalities through crime reduction.91
Reverse location search warrants could provide similar benefits by making it
easier for police officers to connect and solve seemingly disparate crimes.
And providing police officers with the technology to connect disparate
crimes could increase public safety and welfare by increasing law
enforcement’s ability to catch repeat criminals.
2. Preventing Wrongful Convictions
As discussed above, reverse location search warrants could expose
innocent people to criminal liability in certain circumstances. But location
information could also exonerate innocent suspects by proving their location
during the time of the crime.92 Law enforcement’s gathering of detailed
location information through mobile devices around crime scenes could
actually help defense attorneys, who could use location information collected
during discovery to exonerate innocent suspects who might not otherwise be
able to prove their location at the time of the crime. Indeed, ZetX’s own
management team at one point listed shareability of information with defense
counsel during the discovery process as one of the benefits of Trax.93
One well-funded public defender’s office in New York has already
tested whether location information might be useful to its clients.94 The office
purchased a laboratory full of digital forensics equipment and then provided
89

Id.
Id. at 4–5.
91
Id. “Hot-spot policing” is a reactive strategy that deploys police officers to areas where
crime is already most concentrated. “Risk-terrain modeling,” which is more forward thinking,
uses risk modeling to make future deployment decisions. Examples of better outcomes include
reduced numbers of reported incidents or and reduced instances of observed physical and
social disorder.
92
For example, one man in New Haven, Connecticut, was recently exonerated from a
murder and robbery conviction on the basis of previously hidden cell-site location information.
See Kathleen McWilliams, New Haven Man Jailed For 17 Years Freed after Judge Vacates
Murder, Robbery Convictions, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.courant.co
m/breaking-news/hc-br-vernon-horn-released-wrongful-conviction-20180425-story.html
[https://perma.cc/KZ7Y-BSKC].
93
Basich, supra note 6.
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Kashmir Hill, Imagine Being on Trial. With Exonerating Evidence Trapped on Your
Phone., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/business/lawenforcement-public-defender-technology-gap.html [https://perma.cc/3L5L-4P5D].
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location information on one client’s Google phone as an alibi.95 This led to
the assistant district attorney dismissing the case against that client. 96
Similarly, a defense attorney in Gainesville, Florida recently used Google’s
location data to vindicate a client investigated on the basis of a reverse
location search warrant.97 These examples show how location information
can be used by defense counsel to prove the innocence of suspects.
However, at the moment, public defenders and other defense attorneys
often lack access to location information and other resources used by
government prosecutors because it can be so expensive to pull information
from a suspect’s phone.98 Because location information is so expensive to
capture, the discovery process for a case involving a reverse location search
warrant could allow defense attorneys to determine their own client’s
location and movements at a much lower cost. Eventually, widespread
adoption of the technology around reverse location search warrants could
lead to lower prices and greater accessibility to personal location
information, allowing defense lawyers to better protect their clients.
III. POTENTIAL FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO REVERSE
LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS
Reverse location search warrants are likely to face a multitude of legal
challenges as they become a mainstream tool used by law enforcement
agencies. A primary vehicle for these challenges will likely be the Fourth
Amendment, which states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be searched.”99 Specifically,
opponents may argue that reverse location search warrants do not satisfy the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement as it is traditionally
understood. This Part will outline the history of the Fourth Amendment and
discuss reverse location search warrants’ similarities to problematic
“general” warrants. Next, it will review recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
relating to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement and discuss
whether reverse location search warrants satisfy this requirement.

95

Id.
Id.
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Schuppe, supra note 45.
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Hill, supra note 94 (discussing how equipment that analyzes location information costs
around $100,000 – “a fortune in a public defender’s budget”).
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A. REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS AS “GENERAL
WARRANTS”

One of the potential challenges reverse location search warrants might
face is that they are strikingly similar to the overly broad English general
warrants which the Fourth Amendment was drafted to ban.100 These general
warrants were authorized by either the King or the courts, and “lack[ed]
particularity regarding the person or place to be searched, or the papers or
records to be seized.”101 At the time, some English and American writers
considered general warrants to be the height of tyranny because they gave
officers an incredible amount of discretion in deciding where and whom to
investigate.102 General warrants went so far as to allow officers to enter a
house without a warrant if they were searching for a felon, which would have
been condemned under common law at the time.103 The solution to these
concerns was the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants satisfy a
“probable cause” standard before a judge signs them.104
Reverse location search warrants might be analogized to general
warrants because both lack specificity with regards to the person or place to
be searched. By not requiring police officers to have probable cause against
any of the individual people they are searching before requesting location
information, reverse location search warrants arguably recreate the exact
issue the Framers were trying to prevent. Thus, from an originalist
perspective, reverse location search warrants might circumvent the Framers’
intentions behind the Fourth Amendment.
B. LOCATION INFORMATION & PROBABLE CAUSE

While an originalist challenge against reverse location search warrants
is possible, arguments against the constitutionality of this technology will
likely focus more on whether it satisfies probable cause. In Brinegar v.
United States, the Court stated that probable cause must be “more than bare
100

Thomas Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
551 (1999); see also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (“Vivid in the memory of
the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance
under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists.”).
101
Id.; see also Henry Farrell, America’s Founders Hated General Warrants. So Why Has
the Government Resurrected Them? WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/14/americas-founders-hated-general-warrants-sowhy-has-the-government-resurrected-them/ [https://perma.cc/KUQ2-SPA2].
102
Davies, supra note 100, at 689–91 (discussing writings of James Otis, who “denounced
general writs of assistance as a violation of American liberties” and John Adams, who wrote
an abstract of Otis’s argument that “[r]eason and the constitution are both against this writ”).
103
Id. at 578.
104
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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suspicion.”105 Instead, probable cause exists when a reasonable person acting
on reasonably trustworthy information would have believed that based on the
facts and circumstances of the case, the offense had been committed.106 This
standard leaves breathing room for some law enforcement error through the
“reasonable” qualifier. 107
More recently, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court
confirmed that one of the goals of the Framers was to “place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”108 The Carpenter Court
explained that the preservation of the Fourth Amendment required protection
from the encroachments of advancing technology, specifically cell-site
location information.109 As such, the Court held that the government must
“obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such
records;” it could not simply request the information through a court order.110
The Court further stated that probable cause typically requires some level of
“individualized suspicion.”111 Accordingly, law enforcement needed more
than a court order to request personal location information under the Fourth
Amendment because the showing required to get a court order did not reach
the level of probable cause.112
The Supreme Court decision in Carpenter specifically concerned
whether or not a warrant was required in the context of cell-site location
information (CSLI).113 The case arose when the government requested CSLI
for suspected accomplices to a robbery and used this information to prove
that the suspects were at or near the crime scene during the time of the
robbery.114 The CSLI referred to in Carpenter is created through cell phones
pinging nearby radio antennas, which are called cell sites.115 While the Court
made it clear that the government must generally show probable cause in

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (holding that “[p]robable
cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”)
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
109
Id. at 2223.
110
Id. at 2221.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 2208–09.
114
Id. at 2212–13.
115
Id. at 2208–09.
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order to receive CSLI,116 the Court has yet to indicate whether this reasoning
extends to GPS location information.117 However, Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in United States v. Jones, where the Court similarly considered
location data, seems to at least suggest that law enforcement agencies would
need warrants (and in turn, probable cause) in order to track the location
information of a regular person through GPS technology.118
Furthermore, as the Court held in Carpenter, probable cause requires
some level of individualized suspicion based on the facts.119 In In re Oakland,
one federal court expounded on this, holding that a warrant compelling “any
individual,” including non-suspects who were simply present at the scene
covered by the warrant, to unlock their device through biometric measures
was overbroad because the request was not limited to “a particular person nor
a particular device.”120 Though the California court made this decision within
the context of biometric technology, it acknowledged its duty under
Carpenter to protect individuals’ constitutional rights from technological
encroachments.121 Courts could apply similar reasoning to overturn reverse
location search warrants, which can cover every phone in a specific area and
similarly do not list every individual or device that they are targeting. Reverse
location search warrants, like the warrant in In re Oakland, are problematic
because of the way that they capture the location data of innocent people who
were simply present at the time of a lawful arrest.122
C. PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO REVERSE LOCATION
SEARCH WARRANTS

Based on the reasoning in Carpenter and In re Oakland, reverse location
search warrants put the cart before the horse. The second warrant in a reverse
location search warrant would likely satisfy the probable cause framework
established by the Court due to its basis in suspicious location information
116

Id.
Id.
118
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (“GPS monitoring—by making
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of information about any person
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, choose to track—may ‘alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to a democratic
society.’”).
119
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
120
In re Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
121
Id. (“The challenge facing the courts is technology is outpacing the law. In recognition
of this reality, the United States Supreme Court recently instructed courts to adopt rules that
‘take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’”)
(quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19).
122
Id.
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trends brought to light through the first warrant. However, the first warrant
has a much thinner justification. Essentially, to satisfy the test under
Carpenter, law enforcement officials must make the argument that being
near a crime scene puts one under enough individualized suspicion to satisfy
the probable cause requirement even though proximity to a crime scene might
have nothing to do with criminal activity.123
This argument is not as far-fetched as it might sound, especially when
search warrants are narrowly defined. Evidence showing that a stranger’s cell
phone was inside an apartment within an hour of a murder or theft would
certainly make many reasonable police officers suspicious about the
activities of the cell phone’s owner.124 In this way, narrowly defined reverse
location search warrants can be analogized to traditional warrants for
individuals seen by eyewitnesses or caught on video camera near the crime
scene. However, reverse location search warrants authorized for huge areas
or vast periods of time are much harder to justify. As such, courts should
push back against overly broad reverse location search warrants to ensure
that law enforcement acts properly within the probable cause framework.
In addition to pushing back against broad reverse location search
warrants, courts should also consider the fact that, perhaps unlike information
provided in traditional warrants, the GPS information provided by law
enforcement in reverse search warrants may not be particularly reliable.125
As the Court stated in Brinegar, part of satisfying probable cause requires a
judge to evaluate whether the warrant they are authorizing is based on
“reasonably trustworthy” information.126 The Court simplified this
requirement in Illinois v. Gates, where it stated, “[t]he task of the issuing
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth [ . . . ] there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”127
Reverse location search warrants make this analysis more complicated
because unaided judges are often ill-suited to the task of evaluating the

123
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“The Court requires
‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before a search or seizure take place.”).
124
Ben Levitan, How Cellphones Help Catch Criminals, CRIME ONLINE (Dec. 29, 2016)
https://www.crimeonline.com/2016/12/29/cellphones-and-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/HV2
H-P2UP].
125
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 266 (1983) (concurring with the majority and stating
that courts assume good faith in police officers and should eschew inquiries into the
“subjective beliefs” of law enforcement); see supra notes 67–68.
126
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–176 (1949).
127
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
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accuracy of data provided by Google and other location information
providers.128
As already explained, the accuracy of Google’s information is far from
perfect.129 Thus, judges decide whether probable cause exists without
adequate information about both the size of the targeted area and the accuracy
of the GPS tracking data that is informing the warrant.130 Additionally, the
second warrant within a reverse location search warrant is based on the
results of the first warrant.131 This means that when judges authorize the
second warrant, they are likely proceeding on the assumption that Google
provided law enforcement with results accurate enough to be considered
“reasonably trustworthy.”132 This assumption might be justified because the
“reasonable” qualifier leaves police officers some room for error in
requesting warrants.133 Until the technology improves, however, legitimate
concerns around the trustworthiness of warrants issued based on Google’s
location information will persist, even when judges find that the warrants
satisfy probable cause.
In summary, Fourth Amendment challenges against reverse location
search warrants are inevitable.134 These challenges might come from an
originalist perspective based on the similarity between reverse location
search warrants and general warrants. However, they will likely be primarily
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter, with litigants arguing
that courts may not grant a request to search every mobile device in an area
because such a request would not be based on individualized suspicion, and
accordingly, it would not satisfy the Court’s probable cause standard.135 In
fact, these challenges have already begun. A federal district court in
Richmond, Virginia is currently preparing to rule on a Fourth Amendment
challenge against a reverse location search warrant.136 Both defense counsel
and the government relied on the ruling in Carpenter in the case’s briefing,
which also included a neutral amicus from Google.137 Defense counsel even
compared reverse location search warrants and general warrants in their
briefings, before arguing that the third-party doctrine should not apply to
128
129
130
131
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133
134
135
136
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Google’s location information and stating that reverse location search
warrants are “invalid ab initio,” or void.138 The outcome of this pending
litigation will serve as a litmus test for the success of Fourth Amendment
challenges against reverse location search warrants.
IV. PROPOSED JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The traditional probable cause framework might have been appropriate
at the time it was put forward. But in recent years, the weight of technological
innovation and changing consumer privacy expectations may have pushed it
to its limits.139 Reverse location search warrants are especially problematic
because judges might struggle to assess the probability that warrants will lead
to evidence based on the information law enforcement provides, especially
within the limited time judges spend reviewing warrants.140 This Part will
discuss two potential solutions to this challenge. First, courts can use an
alternative framework when deciding whether to grant reverse location
search warrants. Second, federal and state legislatures can adopt three
legislative proposals that collectively would put judges in a better position to
decide whether warrants satisfy probable cause.
A. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS: A NEW PROBABLE CAUSE
EXCEPTION

Though the Fourth Amendment’s language explicitly requires that
warrants be supported by probable cause,141 there are exceptions to this
requirement.142 Examples of these exceptions include exigent
circumstances,143 searches incidental to arrest,144 and hot pursuit.145 In this

138
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partially because of the immense capacities of modern technology, such as cell phones, to
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vein, courts could create a new exception to the probable cause requirement
to address the unique problems presented by reverse location search
warrants. Similar to exigent circumstances cases, the court would essentially
be acknowledging that while reverse location search warrants do not satisfy
traditional probable cause analysis, in some emergency circumstances they
might be needed in order to prevent a greater tragedy. One example of a
situation where the government might argue that their interest in national
security outweighs constitutional concerns would be in the context of
terrorist threats.146
To determine whether the exception applies, courts could perform a
balancing test for reverse location search warrants. Under this balancing test,
courts would weigh the government’s need for information in specific,
emergency circumstances against the risk of violating people’s Fourth
Amendment rights. This alternative framework follows reasoning similar to
that used in cases involving “exigent circumstances.”147 The exigent
circumstances148 exception allows officers to take certain actions, such as
conducting warrantless searches, that would otherwise be legally suspect, in
order to protect or preserve lives.149 Google’s policy of providing information
without a warrant in emergency circumstances shows that even large
corporations agree that when human life is at imminent risk, privacy concerns
can become secondary.150 Courts must be cautious in considering whether a
particular request falls within the exigent circumstances exception in light of
the constitutional concerns related to warrantless searches.151 They would
need to be similarly judicious in granting reverse location search warrants for
this emergency balancing test solution to work. For example, courts would
need to carefully consider the area surveyed and the context of the warrant
as well as how pressing law enforcement’s need for information is.
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This proposed balancing test framework would allow judges to take the
purpose of a reverse location search warrant into account when deciding the
whether to grant it. Law enforcement agencies, however, may not support
this new approach since it may prevent them from using a valuable tool in
their arsenal in some circumstances, and courts tend to give great deference
to law enforcement agencies.152 Courts might also hesitate to propose a
balancing test because of the additional strain on judicial resources any speed
bump in the warrant approval process could create.153 Judges must always be
on call in order to approve warrants, and law enforcement may call in at odd
hours as needed.154 Indeed, as judges already seem to lack the time or
resources necessary to spend more than several seconds to review a
warrant,155 they may be especially reluctant to add a balancing test. Given the
limitations of a judicial solution, a better solution would be for state and
federal legislatures to write laws ensuring that reverse location search
warrants satisfy traditional probable cause analysis.
B. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

While some state lawmakers may prefer to ban reverse location search
warrants entirely, as some have already proposed,156 others will likely aim to
regulate them more closely. For the jurisdictions focused on regulation, there
are a few common-sense legislative solutions that could significantly
minimize the reverse location search warrant’s impact on privacy and also
have a good chance of passing. In today’s polarized political environment,
cooperation between both parties in state and federal legislatures might seem
quixotic at best, but consumer privacy expectations are a bipartisan
152
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concern.157 Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress continue to draft
privacy bills addressing the distribution of personal information and the role
of corporations in protecting consumer privacy.158 In 2019 alone, over 150
pieces of legislation on data privacy were considered by state legislatures in
both blue and red states.159
Thus, it seems possible that some of these legislatures might consider
including regulations on reverse location search warrants as part of their
comprehensive data privacy reform bills.160 Furthermore, passing legislation,
especially at the federal level, would ensure more uniform compliance across
jurisdictions. This Comment proposes three specific laws that would
cumulatively limit the reverse location search warrant’s impact on privacy: a
printed maps requirement, a mandated anonymization process for
information gained via the first warrant, and a requirement that law
enforcement erases unnecessary data collected by reverse location search
warrants.161
1. Printed Maps Requirement
The first and simplest legislative proposal would require that all reverse
location search warrants contain a printed map of the area in question
alongside GPS coordinates. In order to satisfy a probable cause analysis, the
warrant must present an area that judges can actually visualize. GPS
coordinates or written descriptions might be helpful, but they do not provide
judges with a full picture of the area to which they are granting police access.
For example, a warrant might say “between the Hilton hotel and the
intersection on Chicago Avenue” but fail to make note of the large residential
apartment complex in between those two places. This would be problematic
because the judge might unknowingly authorize the search of thousands of
extra mobile devices belonging to people simply going about their day-today lives. A current map printed from Google Earth or any equivalent
157
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software could help prevent this problem and lead to fewer people having
their information needlessly shared with law enforcement.
Implementing this kind of legislation should be relatively inexpensive,
as the Trax software used by law enforcement to create reverse location
warrants already has the capability to create maps using Google Earth.162 In
fact, law enforcement officers already use the Trax software to map the area
they are targeting before sending coordinates.163 Law enforcement officials
would only need to attach a copy of the map they created to the warrant
before sending it to a judge. This simple legislative measure would allow
judges to more thoroughly analyze whether a reverse location search warrant
satisfies probable cause and could prevent police officers from casting too
wide a net.164
2. Mandated Anonymization Process for the First Warrant
A second legislative proposal would require the initial reverse location
search warrant to be protected by some anonymization process so that law
enforcement would be unable to trace the location information back to
individuals without getting judicial approval for a second warrant. Currently,
Google uses a system of anonymized numbers in place of names when
providing information in the initial reverse location warrants, which leads to
a relatively higher degree of privacy for individuals whose sensitive location
information is shared with law enforcement.165 More detailed account
information, including the people’s names, is withheld from law enforcement
officers until they narrow down the list of suspects and request a second
warrant based on suspicious location history and trends.166 As other tech
companies expand their ability to collect location information, state and
federal legislatures should codify Google’s anonymization process to ensure
that individuals’ location information is adequately protected.
Limiting police access to personal information could go a long way
towards curtailing abuses by police officers and information leaks to the
press. This proposed legislation would also provide a baseline privacy
standard for smartphone consumers. This concern may become even more
important as tech companies ramp up their use of location tracking services
162
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in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the need for contact tracing.167
This legislation would also help hold Google accountable if consumer
privacy becomes less valuable168 to the company in the future.169 Finally,
keeping personal information anonymous during the initial warrant would
also help ensure that reverse location search warrants satisfy probable cause
analysis. This is because with anonymization, the initial warrant would only
authorize a very limited release of data to law enforcement on the basis of
being near a crime scene.
3. Erasing Unnecessary Data Collected by Reverse Location Search
Warrants
A third and final legislative proposal would require that police
departments dispose of unneeded information (location-related or otherwise)
derived from reverse location search warrants after the investigation is
considered closed. Currently, police departments nationwide may keep data
pulled from sources such as reverse location search warrants in their archives
indefinitely.170 This practice may make sense for information derived from
traditional search warrants because everyone implicated in those warrants
likely at least satisfied the probable cause analysis. Reverse location search
warrants, however, can contain the location information of many more
innocent people than traditional warrants, especially in metropolitan areas.171
This information is not easily accessible to the public through Freedom of
Information Act requests,172 but information held by law enforcement could
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be leaked to the media,173 collected by hackers,174 or used by nefarious police
officers175 despite arguably having been collected without probable cause.
Law enforcement agencies will likely push back against regulations that
require them to destroy location information.176 They might argue that
compiling large amounts of data across different agencies can help police
officers better solve crimes as their departments’ data analytics capabilities
grow more powerful.177 Indeed, law enforcement officials have successfully
made similar arguments regarding DNA databases.178 Though courts have
been willing to consider privacy concerns in the DNA context, they have
historically given great deference to the state’s public interest in catching
criminals.179
Unlike DNA databases, however, reverse location search warrants
provide law enforcement agencies with location information about innocent
citizens that officers can immediately use without needing to send anything
to a lab. This information could include a person’s name, workplace, or home
address. Malicious police officers or any third party could more easily abuse
location information in comparison to DNA evidence because they can use
location information to easily identify an individual and find where they live.
On the other hand, while DNA provides very sensitive information, it
requires translation by scientists in order for a lay person to understand.
173
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Law enforcement officials might also argue that requiring the careful
deletion of location information might be logistically difficult and expensive.
For example, even after the case is officially closed, it may prove challenging
for law enforcement agencies to draw the line between truly unnecessary
information and slightly suspicious information that has potential relevance
in case the investigation is reopened. Furthermore, it might be cost
prohibitive for government officers to audit how often law enforcement
officers are deleting extraneous information collected by reverse location
search warrants. That being said, requiring police officers to delete
unnecessary information collected by the first warrant in a reverse location
search warrant would go a long way towards assuaging some of the
fundamental privacy concerns citizens might have with the technology.
Taken together, all three legislative measures proposed by this Comment
would help combat the potential dangers to privacy presented by the
widespread adoption of reverse location search warrants.
CONCLUSION
The reverse location search warrant is a powerful new technology
capable of both making our lives safer and pushing us further towards allpervasive government surveillance. As local police departments continue to
adopt and refine this new tool and tech companies expand their capabilities
for storing consumer location information, citizens’ Fourth Amendment right
to be free from searches without probable cause requires further protections.
These protections could come at least in part from the courts, which have
strained to adapt the probable cause framework to new technological
developments. In lieu of judicial action, however, federal and state
legislatures must create new laws to help judges better analyze whether
warrants satisfy probable cause in order to protect innocent people from
having their location information shared with police officers or even with the
public at large.
The three laws proposed by this paper simply represent a starting point
for protecting American citizens from reverse location search warrants. They
would help assuage some of the practical and constitutional difficulties that
these new warrants present. However, as more data is collected around the
accuracy and effectiveness of reverse location search warrants, legislators
will likely need to consider more specific laws and regulations in order to
protect fundamental privacy concerns. These more technologically
sophisticated solutions might include mandated support staff for police
departments opting to use reverse location search warrants or proof of
accuracy benchmarks before tech companies may provide police officers
with location information in criminal cases. As a society, we seem to be
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inching closer and closer towards a surveillance state. Still, reverse location
search warrants are likely a necessary evil to help law enforcement officials
keep in lockstep with tech-savvy criminals. Through the use of alternate legal
frameworks, common-sense legislative protections, and careful approval of
warrants, however, we can curtail the privacy impact of the reverse location
search warrant.

